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Indirect Transfers in Trade Among Former Soviet Union Republics: Sources, Patterns and Policy Responses in the Post-Soviet Period* I. Introduction
The former Soviet Union (FSU) was composed of fifteen republics which were very unevenly endowed with human, physical and natural resources. To contain regional imbalances within the Union and to integrate all republics into a tight and centrally commanded division of labour, the Central government operated a scheme of vertical fiscal redistribution between the Union budget and the Republican budgets. Through this system poorer republics became net receivers of direct transfers and richer republics became net donors. This scheme which collapsed with the dissolution of the Union in 1991, channelled sizeable funds to the poorer Central Asian republics relative to their material product. Yet, it failed to equilibrate large existing differences between the per capita fiscal revenues of the republics [Orlowski, 1992] .
Budgetary support through direct transfers, however, was not the only mechanism to redistribute income between the republics. Inter-republican trade flows in which prices for goods were set by the authorities independently from the market mechanism became the second channel of income transfers. Whenever such setting led prices to diverge from a level which would be determined by the free interaction of market forces, trade flows include a transfer element. Importers of overpriced goods "donated" parts of their income to the exporting countries. So did exporters of underpriced products vis-a-vis importers. Such implicit transfers were not unique in trade between centrally planned economies. They have sometimes also been included in trade flows between market economies.
1 Yet, contrasting to market economies, they were a central element in trade among centrally planned economies and constituted an important mechanism of inter-state income redistribution.
To abandon such a system at short notice, can result in severe adjustment problems in net recipient countries especially if import demand is price inelastic and domestic substitutes are not available. To assess the degree of adjustment requirements, it is necessary to delineate the This paper reports on research undertaken in a project on prerequisites of integrating the former Soviet Union into the world economy. Financial support from the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.
The author is indebted to Rolf J. Langhammer and Matthias Lu'cke for useful comments and suggestions. He remains solely responsible for all remaining errors.
The arrangements of the EC with African and Caribbean sugar producers under the so-called sugar protocol of the Lome' Conventions or so-called "surprix" arrangements to overprice francophone African exports of raw materials to France and to overprice French manufactured exports to the African countries in the post-colonial period provide evidence for such transfers in market economies [Kreinin, 1973; Ndongko, 1973; Koester, Hermann, 1987] .
sectoral structure of trade flows by the magnitude of deviations of domestic prices from world markets prices. For trade among the FSU republics, this is done in Section II where in particular the distinction between energy and non-energy products is highlighted. Section III discusses the regional pattern of transfers in order to identify net donors and net recipients to assess the magnitude of transfers for the individual countries. An answer to this question could allow for hints on the preference of net recipients to remain in a currency union with the net donors in order to benefit from continued direct transfers or from credits.
Having laid out the empirical evidence of indirect transfers, their underlying instruments are examined in Section IV.
Section V analyses the implications of abandoning implicit transfers in the process of economic transformation and the options which are available to facilitate adjustment towards undistorted prices. Section VI concludes on the findings and presents selected policy recommendations.
II. Indirect Transfers by Sectors
To assess the contribution of individual tradables to indirect transfers, it is necessary to relate a vector of traded quantities to vectors of both undistorted prices (preferably world market prices) and distorted prices representing domestic prices and to compare the different trade volumes.
2 Such a comparison is admittedly crude as it excludes reactions of purchasers to changing relative prices in terms of changing quantities supplied and demanded. Therefore, it is a "back-on-the-envelope" calculation based on a partial equilibrium analysis with fully price inelastic demand and supply.
Such an exercise was done by the former Central Statistical Office of the USSR (Goskomstat) for 1987-90 intra-Union trade in fifteen sectors. It shows to what extent intra-Union trade flows would have changed in value terms if instead of domestic prices so-called "world market" prices had been applied. It goes without saying that this approach is highly debatable for non-homogeneous goods, particularly in non-standardised manufactures in capital and intermediate goods industries. Notwithstanding such general doubts, the approach can be challenged especially for the former USSR. Due to its long-standing isolation from world markets and the political priorities under which companies had to work, these companies supplied goods for which world market prices either did not exist or were irrelevant. For instance, this held for large parts of the capital goods industry which was subordinated to the military-industrial complex. Thus, the exercise seems useful only for homogeneous primary commodities such as primary energy, agricultural goods, food products, and to some extent for standardised manufactures produced in light industries (textiles, footwear). However, even in these sectors the Goskomstat data should be cautiously interpreted because the price vector cannot be split between individual products. Nor do the data allow to identify exchange rates.
This restricts the analysis to a plausibility test of the magnitude of differences between world market and domestic prices and their direction in individual sectors.
The matrix of intra-FSU trade flows in domestic and world market prices is reported in Appendix Table 1 . The relevant extract from the raw data are averages of world marketdomestic market price ratios over all republics weighted by trade volumes of individual republics in 1990 (Table 1) . Overall, the ratios display a wide spread ranging from strongly underpriced trade (relative to world market prices) in oil and gas (ratio: 2.7) 3 to overpriced trade in light industries (ratio: 0.33). This spread indicates a large extent of discriminatory pricing between sectors and -as a result of that -high indirect transfers channelled from net exporters (importers) of underpriced (overpriced) goods to the net importers (exporters). In general, domestic prices differed more from world market prices in resource-based sectors including light industries and agricultural products than in manufactured goods. Given its weight in total intra-FSU trade, the oil and gas sector played a dominant role in the transfer mechanism. This finding emerges from Table 2 which shows current ruble values of cumulative indirect transfers by commodity groups. In 1990, the oil and gas sector accounted for almost 61.5 per cent of transfers through underpriced exports, followed by machine building (17 per cent) and the other resource-based sectors: ferrous metals (6.7 per cent) and non-ferrous metals (10.6 per cent). The placement of machine building among sectors which domestic prices were much lower than world market prices is somewhat puzzling given the well-established myth that the former Soviet machine industry was a large recipient of transfers. But a possible explanation may lie on the side of unproportionally large direct transfers to this sector, well hidden in the military budgets and thus difficult to document. Transfers in terms of overpriced imports concentrated on two consumer industries, i.e.: the light industry (44.8 per cent) and the food industry (31.2 per cent).
This sectoral structure of price distortions is not unique as far as its incidence is concerned. The fact that Soviet consumers carried a large burden of distortions while manufacturers of capital and consumer goods enjoyed subsidisation through easy access to cheap raw materials and intermediates can also be observed in Western economies. In these economies, the escalation of tariffs and non-tariff barriers with increasing stage of production leads to higher rates of effective protection in finished goods industries than in backward-linked industries and produces similar results. Differences between the two systems exist in the tools which they apply for achieving sectoral discrimination. While border measures prevail in Western economies, the closed economy-type of socialist economies used indirect taxes and subsidies as measures of discrimination (see below Section IV). It shall be further noted that the result of highly overpriced imports in the food and light industries may be overstated by the peculiar system of data collection and reporting in the FSU. In this system, domestic prices of export goods were in fact prices paid by trading enterprises to domestic producers (or, in other words, prices de facto received by domestic producers), while domestic prices of imported goods were actual prices paid by final domestic buyers. Thus on the export side turnover taxes are not included, while import prices included turnover taxes and other charges. A sample of recalculation aimed at eliminating this distortion is presented in Section IV of the paper.
It is noteworthy that prices for unprocessed agricultural products were closer to world market prices than prices for processed goods (food). As it is known that prices for basic food were subsidised, indirect taxation for other goods (in particular alcoholic beverages) must have been more important. It is in this sector where price comparisons become somewhat dubious because of distortions inherent in world market prices (for instance, the downward pressure on world market prices due to OECD countries' subsidised exports of their domestic surpluses).
In total, the Goskomstat figures yield that negative transfers exceeded positive transfers by about 17 per cent. The main burden of protecting domestic industries against world market competition had to be shouldered by Soviet consumers who, however, also benefited, but to a much smaller extent, from underpriced energy. The main beneficiaries of distortions were the relatively energy-intensive industries which received incentives to wastefully absorb energy. Irrespective of the regional distribution of indirect transfers among republics which is discussed in the next chapter, the results suggest a regional distribution of transfers between regions producing consumer goods and those consuming them. To some extent, these were identical regions. Consumer goods were produced mainly in and around the urban agglomerations in the European part of the Union which also hosted the largest part of the population [Langhammer, Sagers and Lticke, 1992] . Such intra-republican flows of transfers between consumers and producers are disregarded in the following but should be taken into consideration.
HI. Regional Distribution of Indirect Transfers
Indirect transfers were unevenly distributed among the FSU republics. Details of the allocations of these transfers between the republics are presented in Table 3 . Without exceptions, transfers were conducted by the individual republics through underpriced exports of oil and natural gas, and overpriced imports of non-oil and gas products. On the other side, transfers were received through overpriced exports of non-oil and gas products and underpriced imports of oil and gas.
It shall be, however, noted that comparisons of domestic prices and world market prices, especially for non-oil and gas products, do not match purchasing power parity conditions since the Soviet statistical agency Goskomstat used the official Gosbank fixed exchange rate of .60 rubles per US dollar for the computation of world market prices for Soviet products [Granberg, 1992, p. 11] . Yet, the level of exchange rate does not affect the identification sectoral and regional flows of transfers since these are closely tied to distortions of Soviet relative prices as compared to world market relative prices [op.cit., p. 7].
As concerns the source and direction of indirect transfers, the FSU republics can be grouped into four boxes (Table 4) . One box is filled with Russia alone as it is the only country which conceded transfers both by exporting oil and gas below world market prices and by importing non-oil and gas products above world market prices. Turkmenia and Azerbaijan as the other net exporters of underpriced oil and gas also enjoyed the receipt of transfers through their overpriced exports of non-oil and gas. They are therefore grouped in the second box but also show differences as Turkmenia was a net donor of transfers while Azerbaijan was a net recipient. Box 3 contains those four countries (Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia) which acted as donors through importing non-oil and gas products above world market prices but also benefited from importing oil and gas (from Russia) below world market prices. For all four countries, the latter flow was quantitatively much more important so that they appeared as net recipients. Ukraine has been the most important recipient in this group so that one can conclude that the most important individual flow of indirect transfers within the FSU was that of subsidized oil and gas products from Russia to the Ukraine.
4 Table 3 indicates that more than 50 per cent of the Russian net transfers in oil and gas trade accrued to the Ukraine. Finally, eight former republics can be clustered into the fourth box as they were "double" recipients both by importing underpriced goods and exporting overpriced goods. Given the product composition of price-distorted trade flows, it can be assumed that these countries would be hit most by bringing domestic market prices closer to world market prices. They would have to accept much higher import prices for energy products for which domestic or non-CIS originating substitutes would not exist in the short run. On the other hand, they probably face a more price-elastic import demand of the other countries vis-a-vis their industrial exports. Thus, they would have to accept substantial barter terms of trade losses both through increased import prices and lowered export prices.
This computation, however, can only serve as a rough indicator for differences in the magnitude of transfers between the individual republics but not as a proxy for the absolute size of the transfers. Such an assessment would have to be related to the GNP in world market prices which has never been conducted by the FSU statistical authorities. A comparison of these shares (Table 3 , final column) gives rise to a conclusion that a move of domestic prices 4
As Table 3 implies, Russia's total net subsidising position was almost as large on the side of accepting overpriced imports of non-oil and gas products as it was on the side of underpriced export of oil and gas. However, the choice of the official Gosbank exchange rate at .60 Rubles per US-Dollar had a strong impact on that balance. If the chosen rate were more realistic, i.e. assuming a much weaker ruble, the magnitude of subsidies via underpriced exports of oil versus overpriced imports of other products would be much larger.
to world market prices would result in income gains for Russia and even more substantially for Turkmenia. On the other hand, losses would occur for Lithuania, Moldavia, and Georgia.
Such effects have partly materialised in 1992 when all republics gradually moved to world market prices and when, most notably, Russia applied them to its sales of oil and natural gas to other republics as of October 1992. It is still too premature to find data assessing the degree of quantity adjustments and income shocks induced by a widespread move to world prices in inter-republican trade [Noren and Watson, 1992] . Apart from the price elasticities of demand estimates of such trade-related income shocks would have to take the following effects into consideration that, first, there would be an increase in prices of final output in each sector. This increase would be higher in relatively energy-intensive sectors than in other sectors. In any case, the net imports would decline in real terms against the net exports. Secondly, there would be changes in relative prices between former subsidised and discriminated sectors followed by a reallocation of resources between the sectors.
Since the FSU demand for oil and natural gas can be assumed highly inelastic, Russia, by moving to world prices for its resource exports has undoubtedly induced sharp real income declines in other republics. Furthermore, since deliveries of resources and intermediate materials were strictly determined before by central planners, their recipients were generally unprepared to seek alternative suppliers in open markets. This has made the internal demand for most of the products even more inelastic than one could expect in a market-driven environment and has further exposed the system to even deeper income shocks. This strong mutual interdependency of the republics on the deliveries of major products became evident in November 1992 when the Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma admitted that the second largest republic would continue its strong reliance on Russian oil, natural gas and wood because it was unable to finance alternative sources in its demand. On the other hand, importers of formerly overpriced industrial goods could escape to new suppliers outside the CIS and thus reap real income gains provided that they were able to either export goods to hard currency areas or to obtain credits in such currencies.
To summarise, the regional analysis of indirect transfers allows to derive the following observations:
1. Russia and Turkmenia were the only net donors of transfers mostly due to underpriced exports of oil and natural gas. They are expected to gain as a result of the move to world market prices in inter-republican trade.
2. Belorussia and Azerbaijan would incur losses due to overpriced exports of chemicals (as it is reinforced by a closer observation of data in Appendix Table 1 ).
3. Net exporters of food industry and unprocessed agricultural products absorbed transfers due to strong overpricing of these products. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and, most of all, Moldavia would be affected if the opening of markets would force them to accept lower prices.
4. Light industry exporters as Belorussia, the Baltic states and Uzbekistan could face even more adverse effects than the food-exporting countries if higher price elasticities of demand would force them to reduce their prices to the level of the foreign competitors.
FV. Dominant Causes of Indirect Transfers
The network of indirect transfers within the FSU can be attributed to at least three principal factors: the arbitrary investment policy of the central government [Seliverstov, 1992, p. 51] , the system of price fixing and the allocation of turnover taxes and subsidies.
The rigid investment policy of the former Soviet authority was purely politically determined and targeted to introduce industrialisation to remote and/or backward areas of the entire FSU irrespective of high transaction costs. Consequently, Ural and Siberian iron plants became highly dependent on supplies of coal from Kazakhstan [Frantseva, 1992] , the chemical industries of Belorussia and Ukraine developed a strong dependency on Russia's oil, etc. Thus, such centrally determined fixed investment projects induced trade links between areas or republics that were net importers of cheap natural resources and intermediate materials and those which designated their final output of processed goods for the domestic consumption.
The former had to cope with current account deficits which were covered by net capital inflows. This led to the situation where the states of the FSU were highly integrated through the system of state planning of trade and transfers, by far more than the independent world countries of similar income-per-capita groups are expected to be [Fischer, 1992, p. 41] . This integration was not determined by the economic criteria consistent with the factor proportions theory of specialisation. On the contrary, the administrative allocation of fixed capital investment was based upon large investment programs for each individual republic. For instance, there were three major programs for Kazakhstan promoting the development of the military, other heavy industries and the space industry (in Baikonur). Due to these programs Kazakhstan, which -by market economies' standards -would enjoy a comparative advantage in land-intensive and resource-intensive goods, became a stronger player in the capitalintensive military-industrial complex.
Closely related to the investment policy was the system of central price fixing. It is commonly known that prices determined by the central government were fixed for the whole country's economic system. But their adjustments were not balanced between different economic sectors and products and thus led to significant distortions of relative prices compared to prices on world markets. More specifically, prices of basic raw materials and unprocessed intermediate materials were reportedly kept artificially low for longer time intervals in order to ensure "rentability" of producers of processed goods, which output prices were adjusted more frequently by the central government. As a result, exporters of oil, natural gas and other intermediates soon contributed part of their income to the producers of finished goods. At the same time, the plants exporting subsidised goods were compensated for by direct transfers from either the central Soviet budget, or from the republican budgets [Orlowski, 1992, p. 4] . More specifically, these transfers were aimed at financing the delivery of the "overpriced" heavy machinery for oil and gas companies and at creating special wage incentives for workers willing to relocate to the remote areas, especially to Siberia, where vast natural resources were extracted.
In close relation to fixed prices of most of the products in the FSU economy, large transfers, both direct and indirect ones, had to be provided due to large differences in costs of production, especially between the remote areas of resource extraction and other areas. This is because most of selling prices of processed goods were administratively fixed, while costs of their production varied substantially. Consequently, enterprises of the FSU could purchase more or less "underpriced" materials. For instance, Russian chemical and energy companies in Ural enjoyed more indirect transfers through purchases of much cheaper coal from Kazakhstan than the firms in Western Russia dependent on a more expensive Ukrainian coal [Granberg, 1990, p. 78] . In fact, differences in costs of producing identical goods in various FSU regions were striking. As reported by Granberg [op.cit., p. 78 ] the differences in the cost of oil extraction at the end of the 1980s were as high as 5-6-fold, natural gas extraction 5-fold, iron ore 3-4-fold and logging 2-3-fold. The largest discrepancy existed in the case of coal extraction, where the cost differential was 20-fold, spreading between the low-cost surface extraction in Kazakhstan, and the expensive deep mining in Ukraine. Despite the generalised character of these data and the bias stemming from fixing of input prices, one can argue that there had to be a strong mechanism of transfer payments between the republics considering fixed and generally equalized prices of outputs.
The final key reason for indirect transfers was the uneven allocation of turnover taxes and direct subsidies between the FSU republics. More specifically, several republics allocated turnover taxes in proportion to labour expenditures in production. In this case, subsidies for consumer goods were charged to the importing republic and were counted as part of its total consumption fund. Consequently, trade in light industry products, processed food and other consumer goods led to deteriorating trade balances of importing republics. On the other side, intermediate materials were underpriced in inter-republican trade because of heavy subsidies [Langhammer, 1992, p. 255 ; Study of the Soviet Economy (SSE), 1991, p. 194; Granberg, 1992, p. 11] . In addition, transactions caused by visitors were assigned to the republic of permanent residence [SSE, 1991, p. 194] . For instance, food products sold by Ukrainian travellers in Moscow were not recorded as Russia's imports. Such trading by individual visitors has been always attractive and is expected to continue as long as travelling costs on the FSU territory are low. Therefore, the requirement of adjusting domestic to world market prices varies significantly between the republics in each of the examined sectors.
Recalculation of inter-republican trade balances with the adjustment for turnover taxes, consumer subsidies, and trade by visitors was prepared by the Goskomstat SSSR for 1987 and for 1988 and reported in Vestnik Statistiki [3 and 4, 1990] and by Granberg [1992, p. 11] . Based upon this adjustment the 1988 inter-republican trade balance in current rubles worsened in the cases of Russia by 8.4 billion, Georgia 0.4 billion, and Armenia 0.3 billion. It remained unchanged for Ukraine and improved for all the remaining republics, most significantly for Moldavia and Kirgizia by 1.8 billion in both cases. The substantial deterioration of the adjusted balance of Russia is especially interesting. The 8.4 billion rubles reduction in the adjusted balance was primarily caused by the negative adjustments due to consumer subsidies (by 5.4 billion rubles) and turnover taxes (by 3.4 billion rubles) with a slight positive adjustment due to visitors purchases (by 0.1 billion rubles) [SSE, 1991, p. 226] . The reduction caused by payments of turnover taxes and acceptance of subsidies is understandable given the above mentioned common rule of inter-republican trade pricing that consumer subsidies on imported goods were paid by the importing republic consumption fund. Furthermore, the proportionally higher labor costs in Russia than elsewhere in the FSU, also led to increasing Russian revenues in turnover taxes.
V. The Collapse of Indirect Transfers in 1992
For all republics of the former FSU, 1992 was marked by a gradual move to what the Goskomstat estimated to be world market prices in inter-republican trade. This transformation was not caused by purely economic reasons since it would seem to be unwise for most of the republics which were net recipients of indirect transfers from Russia. Clearly, the political disintegration of the FSU has had as a powerful impact on the deterioration of trade and financial linkages between the increasingly independent states.
The move by the republics to world market prices was primarily led by Russia which, under pressure from other republics gradually introducing export and import restrictions, threatened to impose such prices for deliveries of oil, natural gas and other natural resources [see Noren, Watson, 1992, for a detailed presentation]. Ultimately, the Russian Government declared a full adaptation of what it perceived to be world market prices for exports of oil and gas in October 1992.
The introduction of world market prices for oil and gas resulted in a discontinuation of indirect transfers by the net exporters of previously underpriced resources, predominantly by WUUVIIiCH.
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Russia. At the same time, on a somewhat more optimistic side, its government formally declared that it would not impose export taxes on the deliveries of oil and gas to other republics.
The move to world market prices has strongly promoted largely unreported barter transactions between the leading enterprises in different FSU states. 5 This in turn has caused sizeable trade shocks within the FSU economic system. For Russia itself the estimated decline of inter-republican export in real terms in the period 1989 to 1992 reaches 22 per cent (in domestic prices), while the drop of its imports from other FSU republics is expected to be 26 per cent (according to the forecast obtained at the Forecasting Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences). The sharp decline of trade is strongly related to the unusually high degree of inelasticity of demand for products transferred through the FSU economic network and, simultaneously, low substitution between the FSU and external goods. This inelasticity is caused by:
-large shares of standardised, thus inelastic products in total trade, -lack of infrastructure, for instance, ports and pipelines that would bring non-Russian oil and gas to the Ukraine, -a binding character of trade protocols between the states that still attempt fix the volumes of exchange goods, -traditional cooperation links within the large combinats that spread their production allover the FSU territory.
But the gradual deterioration of the official reported inter-republican trade and transfers stemming from distortions of domestic prices from world market levels does not mean that the indirect transfers have been completely discontinued. They have just changed their form being now replaced by extremely large magnitudes of credit rubles and also by technical delays in clearing the payments for trade deliveries by the post-Soviet hanking system that normally take between two and three months. This situation leads to a sizeable depreciation of the real value of import payables in the presence of the ruble inflation running in the second half of 1992 at the average monthly rate of 40 per cent. Needless to say, this technical bottleneck in the payment clearing system is pro-inflationary itself since many exporters According to an estimate by the Institute of Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences currently about 30% of oil deliveries from Russia to other republics are based on unreported, barter transactions between enterprises. This tendency leads to a large overestimation of the trade shock between the republics computed on the basis of official data.
attempt to set current prices at the nominal future value that incorporates the nearhyperinflation rate.
So far, indirect transfers have been sustained through the abundant ruble credit to former net recipients. [Niezawisimaia Gazeta, November 25, 1992] .
If the indirect transfers were abandoned and not replaced by alternative sources of financial assistance large cuts in deliveries and trade-related income shocks could be further expected.
As Table 2 implies, exports of light manufactures and processed food and imports of oil and natural gas, energy, metals and machiners would be most negatively affected.
The production of goods that would fall into either category is spread all over the FSU. However, in some republics these two categories were overproportionately represented in their trade patterns. Exports of processed food were concentrated in Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Latvia and Georgia (as it can be directly observed from Table 3 ). High shares of exports of light industry goods could be seen primarily in Russia, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and Estonia. These republics can be expected to experience income terms of trade losses through declining exports while other former republics such as the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic states, and Kazakhstan would lose in real income by higher import bills for energy.
It is, however, very likely that some transfers to oil and gas recipients will maintain in order to stabilise production in the entire FSU. In designing the system of future cooperation between the republics this option is given a serious consideration, either directly through subsidisation or indirectly through ruble credits. On the other side, transfers to importers of See Central Bank of Russia -Interstate Payments, Moscow, November 1992.
light industry and processed food products might be discontinued, as it appears from ongoing price liberalisation in intra-CIS trade in these goods [Noren and Watson, 1992] .
VI. Concluding Remarks: Policy Solutions
Since 1992, the gradual dismantling of indirect transfers in trade among the FSU states has become a reality which provokes economic policy makers in these countries to either accept the decline of transfers and, consequently, short-term trade related shocks, or to find ways to sustain them.
The proper general message consistent with the general character of economic liberalisation seems to be to deregulate trade, to abandon the role of state intervention and allow uninhibited enterprise-to-enterprise trading. Ultimately, there will be no need for transfers compensating for distortions of prices in inter-republican trade, since these prices will gradually adjust to world market price structures. Liberalised inter-enterprise trade will be undoubtedly more efficient and, therefore, will make subsidies redundant. Accordingly, the role of currently widespread bilateral trade protocols between the republics which are supposed to have a binding impact on trade relations among them should be significantly diminished. It is imperative to note, however, that the current system of inter-republican trade is still based upon the principles of state trading. Yet, the administrative quotas are no longer set by the central government in Moscow, but by many independent state and local economic authorities. Such system causes high transaction costs and leads to the situation in which the role of official state protocols becomes obsolete, since local authorities and enterprises have no incentives to adhere to them. Thus in practice, in 1992 there have been significant problems of fulfilment in the obligatory trade, since local governments impose price controls and export quotas that reduce export incentives of enterprises [Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992, p. 7] .
The gradual decline of indirect transfers in 1992 has been, to some extent, replaced by an accelerated inter-enterprise credit, especially in the first half of 1992 [Ickes and Ryterman, 1993] , followed by the massive extension of the ruble credit examined in Section V. These two substitutes to indirect transfers are inconsistent with the purpose of economic stability in programs of economic transition to market systems. They fuel inflation and prolong inefficiency by extending the "soft budget constraint" to enterprises. Consequently, the easyaccess-credit policy should be phased-out and the inter-enterprise credit could be discouraged by heavy taxation. As replacements for indirect transfers aimed at sustaining trade these instruments should be ruled out. Similarly, a shift toward explicit (direct) transfers compensating for the reduction in indirect transfers is not plausible considering already existing enormous budget deficits in all of the FSU states and a limited external assistance. It would also reinforce the role of central planning and reverse the steps toward economic liberalisation.
Some temporary measures may be considered for the period when state trading and export licensing is still maintained. Among them is a system of auctioning export licences, advocated by Michalopoulos and Tarr [1992, p. 10] . The auction would assign licences to the most efficient suppliers, thus reducing the need for sizeable subsidies and maximising the rents retained in the exporting state. But the system of auctioning export licences is a secondbest solution which is inferior to a policy of removing quantitative restriction in interrepublican trade.
In order to ease the need for indirect transfers a fundamental reform of the post-Soviet trade policy should be undertaken. Almost without exceptions today's regulations of external trade in the FSU republics are based on export restraints. The role of direct import restrictions is minimal, not only in inter-CIS trade, but also in trade with convertible currency areas. Instead it can be argued that the present system indirectly restricts imports, since impediments to exports outside the ruble zone limit the inflow of foreign currency and keep the ruble excessively depreciated and discourage imports. Consequently, the desirable direction of trade reform in the FSU is to shift the role of trade policy from uncoordinated export restrictions, set primarily by local authorities, to a common tariff in trade with outside the CIS and free trade inside. 7 But it is understandable that such a trade reform shall be undertaken only if all the CIS members introduce a far-reaching price liberalisation, at least to the same degree as Russia has attempted to do so as of July 1, 1992, and coordinate fiscal and monetary policies stabilising inflation so that the domestic price base is predictable.
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Along with the trade reform which is essential for diminishing the need for indirect transfers the currency reform will ensure a full convertibility of current accounts. This would remove payment bottlenecks and make compensating transfers obsolete. Enacted for this purpose the "Bishkiek Agreement" of October 9, 1992, signed by the state authorities of the CIS that calls 7 Michalopoulos and Tarr [1992, p. 6] argue that some export licenses and quotas, at least temporary, are justifiable in order to prevent reexporting. But these instruments are determined by local authorities and are not centrally coordinated in practice. Therefore, if local authorities wish to continue with such instruments they will allow reexporting anyway by eagerly granting export licences.
Recently, several authors have advocated a very strong tariff-based protectionism for the CIS. Specifically, McKinnon [1991] suggests to protect negative value added industries in this way on an interim basis, and Corden [1992] proposes this policy as a special case of the infant-industry argument. There are, however, no ways to judge whether any of the protected industries will truly improve their economic efficiency in this way. Most of them have received protection in the form of either direct or indirect transfers over many years of central planning. This policy did not improve the economic efficiency of the Soviet technologically stagnant industries.
for sustaining the ruble zone, bilateral clearing of inter-republican payment balances, and formation of Inter-State Bank facilitating the payment system. The Agreement is the first legislative step in the right direction, but without implementation it will remain as ineffective as many other inter-CIS agreements.
Only far-reaching, market-oriented reforms may ultimately ease up pressures on sustaining indirect transfers among the states of the former Soviet Union. 
